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Introduction
The Accelerated Development Report [World Bank
1981] demonstrates quite clearly that the region's
economies were in serious trouble by 1979. Excluding
Nigeria, GDP per head fell during the l970s by haifa
per cent a year in real terms; food production grew
much more slowly than population so that food
imports increased rapidly; current account deficits
increased from $1.5 bn to $8 bn a year despite
extremely painful cutbacks in imports; and the cost of
servicing foreign debt doubled as a proportion of
foreign exchange earnings.
Crucially, the Report's puts most of the blame for
African countries' economic problems on the policies
of their governments, rather than on their economic
inheritance from the colonial period, or on the adverse
external economic conditions that they have had to
face. As Philip Daniel has also noted, three main
'domestic policy inadequacies' are listed in the Report.
These are: trade and exchange rate policies which
over-protect industry; over-extended public sectors;
prices, taxes and exchange rates which are biased
against agriculture and in favour of industry.
Although generalisations of the type found in the
Report rapidly lose their interest when one begins to
study the problems of a particular country, the power
and influence of the World Bank, including its new
role in making structural adjustment loans, do make it
necessary to examine whether the Report is right or
wrong in its analysis, at the country level. Malawi
makes an interesting case because it seems, at first
glance, to have avoided at least some of the policies
which are supposed to have been the prime cause of
the present crisis. Yet although Malawi's economy
grew quite fast in the 1970s, and may not be in such a
severe economic crisis as some of the other countries in
the region, the economy does nevertheless face serious
short and long-term problems.
Malawi's Recent Economic Policies and
Performance
From 1970 to 1979 real GDP in Malawi grew at an
average of 7 per cent a year. This growth was based on
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agricultural exports, so that the country cannot be
accused of neglecting the agricultural sector, taken as
a whole. Manufacturing industry mainly produces
consumer goods with relatively little protection, and
using relatively labour intensive methods (manu-
facturing employment has risen at about the same rate
as manufacturing value added), so that farmers have
not been forced to buy expensive inputs from an
overprotected local manufacturing sector. Average
real earnings of employees fell steadily through the
l970s from K308 a year in 1970 to K194 a year in 1979,
at 1969 prices. This fall probably overstates the fall in
the real income of most employees, as the average is
pulled down by relatively rapid increases in the
number of low-paid workers. Nevertheless, the overall
wage trend greatly reduced the likelihood of the
Malawian Kwacha being overvalued.
Nor is there much evidence that the public sector is too
big, as it consists mainly of the usual utilities such as
electricity, water and railways. Agricultural marketing
of smaliholder crops for export is, however, in the
public sector, being exclusively handled by ADMARC
(the Agricultural Development and Marketing
Corporation). This body also markets smaliholder
crops for the domestic market in unofficial competition
with private markets. Thanks mainly to the large
profits made by ADMARC itself, the public sector as a
whole was profitable until 1978 and made only a small
loss in 1979. Considerable debate surrounds
ADMARC's pricing policies, as will be discussed
below. Nevertheless it undoubtedly provides a fairly
efficient service in the sense that marketing costs have
not risen as a proportion of turnover, except insofar as
can be explained by the increased cost of oil and
therefore transport, and an increasing proportion of
maize in total tonnage handled.
Concerning the prices that have been offered to
farmers, the real value of ADMARC's prices to
smaliholders has fallen annually since 1973, and prices
for the export crops of tobacco, groundnuts and
cotton were significantly below export parity until the
fall in export prices from 1979 to 1981. The estate
sector, in contrast, was able to sell direct to export
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markets. Furthermore, a large part of the finance for
expansion of the estate sector came from ADMARC,
which invested more than half of its profits in the
1970s in this way. As a result, all of the growth in
agricultural exports, and therefore in total exports,
came from the estate sector. Purchases by ADMARC
from the smaliholder sector actually declined by haifa
per cent a year from 1964 to 1980, even though there
was quite a large implicit subsidy on maize and rice
[Kydd and Christiansen 1981:83].
On the whole, then, with distinct reservations as to
how policy has operated within the agricultural sector,
it could be said that, until 1979, Malawi's policies had
conformed quite closely to what the Report is now
recommending. It could also be said that these policies
had been quite successful in generating economic
growth, based on growing agricultural exports and
accompanied by growth in formal sector employment.
However, Malawi's policy within the agricultural
sector was far from being consistent with the Report's
priorities. Smallholders have not been given priority.
Via ADMARC they have been taxed to the benefit of
investment in estates. Real grower prices have not
been raised but have fallen in every year since 1973,
Admittedly given relative efficiency of marketing
throughout, dramatic real transport cost increases and
the surrender of ADMARC's whole surplus (initially
near 30 per cent of its turnover), it is now hard to see
how they could be. ADMARC has been a dependable
buyer; in the right place, on time with cash. But it has
been a monopoly buyer for export crops. Further, it
has paid pan-territorial prices - raising maize
production in previously non-cash areas, but thereby
also raising average transport costs. Consumer goods
have - at least until 1981 - been fairly readily
available in rural areas. Cautious, profit and export
oriented, and relatively successful in generating
output growth in the 1970s Malawi's agricultural
policy demonstrably was; centred on smaliholders and
on real price increase incentives it was not.
The Recent Crisis
Malawi's barter terms of trade held up quite well until
1977, when they were moderately better than in the
late 1960s and only 7.5 per cent below their 1972 peak.
Malawi's terms of trade fell sharply in 1978, 1979 and
1980 and showed no improvement in 1981, remaining
stagnant at 32 per cent below their 1975-77 average.
Import prices rose 54 per cent in two years and export
prices, which had more or less kept pace with import
prices in 1974 and 1975, did not rise at all in 1979 and
1980. So severe was this loss of international
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Table 1
Malawi's barter terms of trade 1967-80
Source: Reserve Bank of Malawi, Financial and Economic Review,
no3, 198l;Economic Report, 1982.
Note: these calculations exclude sugar exports whose price to Malawi
was high in 198 1,so that the decline in the terms of trade shown
in the table is overstated; however, the price obtained by Malawi
for sugar exports fell disastrously in 1982.
purchasing power that Malawi's current account
deficit rose from an average of K68 mn in 1975-77 to
an average of K 169 mn in 1978-81, in spite of67 per cent
growth in the value of exports in the three years to
1981.
Malawi had to borrow, therefore, an additional
K100 mn a year in the four years from 1978 to 1981,
which was more than twice the average level of foreign
exchange reserves during the period 1974-77.
Previously Malawi had been able to finance most of its
current account deficits with relatively cheap long
term money, so that growth in external debt had been
kept within manageable limits. External public debt
outstanding grew from K120 mn in 1970 to K423 mn
in 1979, but the 1979 figure was actually a smaller
proportion of GNP (at 33 per cent) than the 1970
figure (39 per cent). Because there was some rise in the
proportion of shorter term commercial borrowing, the
burden of debt service rose, but only slightly, as a
percentage of GNP (1.8 per cent to 2.1 per cent) and as
a percentage of exports of goods and services (from
7 per cent to 9.4 per cent).
By 1982 the debt service situation had deteriorated
sharply. The debt service forecast for 1982 is K84 mn,
which would give a debt service ratio of 29 per cent on
the basis of the official export forecast for 1982 (in the
1982 Economic Report), which now seems rather
optimistic. Moreover, these figures do not include
short term debt, which has increased rapidly since
1979: the net foreign asset position of the banking
system went from a negative figure of K9 mn in 1978 to
a negative figure of K112 mn in 1981. Although this
short term debt has been rolled over successfully so
far, the interest burden adds to the country's
(1970 = 100)
1967 87 1972 93 1977 94
1968 90 1973 90 1978 84
1969 93 1974 84 1979 67
1970 100 1975 81 1980 57
1971 102 1976 79 1981 57
problems, and is vulnerable to increases in inter-
national interest rates. This sudden and rapid
worsening of the debt service position, from 9 per cent
to 29 per cent of exports in only three years, was
caused by:
- the need to borrow on much harsher terms,
because soft loans could not expand by nearly
enough to finance the greatly increased current
account deficit;
the sharp increase in both nominal and real
interest rates on commercial-type debt.
Thus external debt slightly more than doubled
between 1978 and 1981, but debt service increased by a
multiple of £10. The damaging increase in 'real'
interest rates is shown in Table 2.
The calculation of 'real' rates of interest implies that
the rate of inflation used in the calculation applies to
the income of the borrower, who thus is able to make
interest and capital payments out of increased
earnings in devalued monetary units. If, however, the
borrower's income does not rise with the general level
of inflation then the real cost of borrowing is higher
than implied by the simple calculation of Table 2. Put
slightly differently, a country in Malawi's position
facing declining terms of trade, must somehow
increase export volume (and borrowing) not just to
pay the higher cost of imports, but also to pay higher
interest on external debt. This item is not included in
the conventional terms of trade calculation.
The worsening debt position would be relatively
manageable if Malawi's exports were to continue
growing and its terms of trade to cease falling. But the
main sources of growth of exports in the 1970s appear
to have been extinguished as a result of the current
Table 2
Real interest rates 1975-81
(percentages)
Source: IMF international Financial Statistics.
economic crisis. As already noted, more than half of
ADMARC's profits in the 1970s were invested in
estate agriculture, providing an important part of the
finance for the growth of exports from the estate
sector. This source of finance for investment in estate
agriculture dried up completely in 1979. Trading
profits for ADMARC of K34 mn and K40 mn in
1976-77 and 1977-78 respectively became only
K5.5 mn a year later and were eliminated in 1979-80
and 1980-81. Overall, ADMARC ran losses in those
latter years, as losses on the supply of fertiliser and
other inputs, plus other expenses, exceeded dividends
and interest on its investments.
A second important source of finance for estate
agriculture was commercial bank lending. From 1970
to 1980, commercial bank lending to the agricultural
sector rose from K2 mn to K93 mn, and from 10 per
cent to 54 per cent of bank advances, so that advances
to the agricultural sector accounted for more than
60 per cent of the increase in bank lending over the
period. As part of a series of macroeconomic measures
introduced in August 1979, to ease the balance of
payments situation, the government implemented a
credit squeeze. Total lending was virtually unchanged
in 1980, and lending to the agricultural sector rose by
Kil mn only by means of a fall in lending to other
sectors, notably the distribution sector. It is doubtful
whether this could be repeated. In any case many
estates were in financial trouble from 1980 because of
a combination of adverse price changes and excessive
reliance on loan finance. There were a number of
bankruptcies. More positively, there was an effort by
the banks to supply technical assistance. In such
circumstances, some of the more recent increases in
lending must have been to cover losses rather than to
finance expansion.
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eurodollar deposit rates
highest month lowest month
industrial country
inflation
range of
interest rates
1975 8.6 6.1 10.8 -2.2 to -4.7
1976 6.2 5.4 7.8 -1.6 to -2.4
1977 7.1 5.1 8.4 -1.3 to -3.3
1978 11.6 7.3 7.2 +4.4 to +0.1
1979 15.0 10.5 9.2 +5.8 to +1.3
1980 19.9 9.8 11.9 +8.0 to -2.1
1981 18.8 12.0 9.9 +8.9 to +2.1
The third source of estate investment - retained
earnings - has also dried up. On an accounting basis
losses predominate and many estates even have
negative current cash flows.
Inevitably, there was a large drop in agricultural as in
other private sector investment. Public sector
investment also fell, though not as drastically.
In 1980, private sector fixed investment was lower in
real terms than it had been in 1973. In 1981 it was so
low, at K33 mn, that it was substantially below the
level needed to maintain the capital stock.
Concerning public sector investment, there may be
some reason for believing that the situation is not quite
as bad as suggested by these figures. A number of large
infrastructural investments, whose contribution to
growth of output is bound to be very small in the
medium term in relation to their cost, have recently
been completed: the new international airport at
Lilongwe, the tarred road to the North, the building of
the new capital city, the extension of the railway to
Lilongwe and on to the Zambian border at Mchinji
(still some 400 miles from the Zambian railway
network). This may be part of the reason why the
Incremental Capital Output Ratio (ICOR) rose during
the 1970s, and could partly justify the official forecast,
in the Economic Report 1982, that the ICOR will fall
from 4.9 in 1983 to 2.8 in 1985, and even lower in 1986
and 1987.
Nevertheless, that same forecast expected estate
agricultural production to grow by 50 per cent from
1982 to 1987, and exports to grow by nearly 150 per
cent over the same period. Even if the economy had
just got through a period of heavy infrastructural
Table 3
Changes in gross fixed investment 1977-81
(percentages)
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Most Malawians are small peasant farmers but government policy has
discriminated in favour of estate production which has now reached
an impasse. (Malawian peasant weeding groundnuts)
investment with relatively little impact on output,
much of that same investment would require current
expenditure by the government, for example the new
airport, and Air Malawi (which ran up large losses in
1977-80). Meanwhile the government itself was not
only running a much increased overall deficit and had
moved into recurrent deficit, but was unable to reduce
the deficit despite strenuous efforts to do so.
In 198 1-82 the overall deficit was budgeted to fall to
K80 mn from Kl 16 mn the previous year, but in fact
rose slightly to K120 mn.
Source: Reserve Bank of Malawi AnnuaiReport 1980; Economic Report 1982 (not wholly comparable with other source, but basic picture consistent in
both).
Current prices 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
public investment +29 +60 +4 +20 -26
private investment +1 +82 +2 -37 -55
Total +17 +68 +3 -2 -34
In constant prices
(using GDP deflator) 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
public investment +19 +54 -Il +2 -39
private investment -6 +76 -12 -46 -63
Total +8 +62 -12 -17 -45
So the government was in no position to provide the
finance for increased agricultural exports, either
directly, or indirectly (for example, by raising
ADMARC's prices to smallholders for export crops
and covering the resulting ADMARC deficits). Nor
could the commercial banks resume their earlier
growth in lending to agriculture while the balance of
payments remained so heavily in deficit, and while
credit restraint remained a condition of IMF lending
and the World Bank's structural adjustment loan. In
fact, in 1982 the government was again attempting to
cut back on its own spending; and the Reserve Bank
was continuing to rely on credit restraint plus a 15 per
cent devaluation in April 1982, rather than import or
exchange controls, to restrain the level of imports.
Conclusion
In the short run, Malawi survived the collapse of its
terms of trade comparatively well. Growth never fell
below zero (although it did fall below the population
growth rate). The authorities did not have to resort to
controls, so that imports were still obtainable for
production, and indeed for consumption. The black
market rate of exchange, from the evidence of a court
case, involving the (as it happens) legal sale of
travellers cheques, appeared to be only 10 to 15 per cent
higher than the official rate. But the future was heavily
mortgaged: debt service was an increasingly heavy
burden, and investment spending fell drastically.
The situation would not be so serious if export growth
could be maintained. But the three main sources of
finance for export growth in the 1970s, ADMARC's
surpluses, estate profits and bank credit, were no
longer available. Moreover, Malawi's present
situation, precarious as it is, depends on having had
declining real wages, and on even more rapidly
declining real income in smallholder agriculture (since
otherwise people would not have moved into estate
employment in such large numbers, even with the
enforced decline in the numbers going to work in
South Africa). There must be some limit to the
reduction in real wages that can be enforced, and that
in turn limits the options available for generating
future export growth.
In one sense the World Bank has been consistent:
Malawi obtained a Structural Adjustment Loan from
the Bank. But it would seem that this is more a
recognition that Malawi needs balance of payments
support because of the serious impact of external
events, than finance for some form of 'structural
adjustment'. Certainly no significant structural
adjustment measures have been announced, and it is
not particularly easy to see what they might be.
Meanwhile, Malawi is having to cut back on the
already rather meagre levels of public spending,
compared to other countries in the region, on such
areas as health and education, in order to 'justify' the
present levels of borrowing. If this was the reward for
the 'right' policies, competently administered, then
surely the Bank was wrong in playing down the impact
of external events.
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